



**"WHO OWNS ALEXANDER THE GREAT?":
A QUESTION UPON WHICH EU
ENLARGEMENT RELIES**

RESEARCH TEAM

Dr. Katerina Kolozova, lead researcher
Dr. Viktorija Borovska, field research coordinator
Dr. Kalina Lechevska, desk analysis coordinator
Artan Sadiku, MA researcher
Ana Blazeva, MA researcher
Risto Aleksovski, data visualization processing

I. Executive summary

The present study is based primarily on the results of a national poll conducted by ISSHS's team in September 2013 and on a desk analysis of relevant documents and statements of officials which provide the backdrop against which the poll results should be read. The poll sought to measure the support of the general population of a cultural policy carried out by the Government of the Republic of Macedonia with an ambition to instill an official narrative about the Macedonian ethnic and national identity. The policy at issue has been executed in the form of an architectural and monumental art building project dubbed "Skopje 2014." It was carried out with the funding and under the patronage of the Macedonian Government as one of its most ambitious cultural policy related projects, officially announced in February 2010.¹ At the center of this project is the reference to the period of Antiquity of the Kingdom of Macedon as the cultural and historic fundament of the Macedonian identity. According to the results of our analysis, the Project's narrative seems to be at odds with the ruling perception on the matter measured nationwide through the poll whose results are presented below. Namely, the poll shows that the percentage of those who attach defining importance to the period of Antiquity for the formation of the Macedonian identity is 5.8% out of the entire population of the country, and 7.6% among the ethnic Macedonians. According to the perception of the majority of the respondents (19.9%), The Medieval period of Orthodox Slavic Christianity remains to be the defining historic period along with the period of a more recent past, namely Macedonia's independence from Yugoslavia which took place in 1992 (20.1%). The Yugoslav period (16.9%) and that of the turn of 20th century struggle for a Macedonian nation state and liberation from the Ottoman Empire (13.8%) follow right behind.²

Based on our desk analysis of relevant official EU policy documents, formal decisions and official statements, we conclude that the Project's bearing on the accession process is not of direct relevance. The "name issue" between Macedonia and Greece remains to be the central requirement. Nonetheless, through its influence on the "good neighborly relations," "Skopje 2014" affects the process indirectly. The poll we conducted shows that the opinion on this question is utterly split. A slight majority of the respondents, however, believes that "Skopje 2014" does not affect the integration processes (see the results below or in the annex of frequencies). Our poll showed that in a period of less than 4 years, general support for the country's EU membership has fallen for approximately 24%. If the Project's aim is to ameliorate the sense of frustration by the indefinitely prolonged accession, as we demonstrated in a previous study on a similar topic (briefly explained below),³ it evidently does not succeed in doing so. Namely, according to the results of our poll, 73% out of the entire population and 66.5% out of the ethnic Macedonian majority believe the project should not continue.

The disapproval is expressly linked with the financial aspect of the Project seen as overly costly for a state which is at the bottom of economic prosperity in Europe in spite of its positive macroeconomic trends.⁴ Since the start of "Project Skopje 2014" in the beginning of 2010 until April 2013, 35 objects (buildings, statues and monuments) in predominantly neoclassicist style (accompanied by some approximations of the baroque) have been erected upon the decision and with the funds provided by the Ministry of Culture. Several of the most monumental statues (including the "Warrior on a Horse" representing Alexander the Great) have been built upon the initiative of the Municipality of Center with funds provided by the Government, whereas the Government itself appears as the investor of the new monumental buildings of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Constitutional Court, the baroque facade of the Government building and a couple of others. These numbers were presented at a press conference held on 22 of April 2013 by the Minister of Culture Ms Elizabeta Kančeska-Milevska. At the same conference, Minister Kančeska-Milevska informed that a total of 207.872.492 euro has been spent so far on the project.⁵ Macedonia's GDP gross in 2012 was 7,5 billion euro. According to data presented by Minister Kančeska-Milevska the percentages of the annual state budget spent on the project in the course of 2010-2012 are the following: 1.1% in 2010, 2.2% in 2011, 1.6% in 2012 and, finally 1.5% in 2013.⁶

In August 2013, the newly elected Mayor of the Municipality of Center Mr. Andrej Žernovski, member of an opposition party, submitted to the public prosecutor a report of an audit on Municipality's expenses made for "Skopje 2014" with the approval of its former Mayor, Mr. Vladimir Todorovikj.⁷

II. The background: The name dispute and the processes of "antiquization"

"Skopje 2014 Project" is a cultural project with references to history and cultural heritage carried out by the institutions of the Republic of Macedonia and with the goal of affirming national identity perceived as under threat. The threat at issue is seen in the fact that UN's, NATO's and EU's official position is that instead of the country's constitutional name these organizations would use the provisional reference "former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia" as the only official name of the state. The negation of the name of the state is perceived as a negation of the existence of a nationality and also of an ethnic identity.⁸

In 1993 UN Security Council decided that Macedonia could join the United Nation only if it abstains from the use of the name "Macedonia" as a term of self-identification of the state.⁹ This resolution was followed by the "Interim Agreement between the Hellenic Republic and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia," adopted on 13 September 1995, stipulating that the official denomination of the country within the UN would be "the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia." This denomination is provisional, i.e., valid until a name for the state is found which would be mutually acceptable to both Greece and Macedonia. Since the adoption of the UNSC resolution 817, institutions and international organizations of the European Union (such as the Council of Europe) have referred to the state under its provisional name "the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia." After 18 years of haphazard negotiations between Macedonia and Greece, a solution to the name issue has not been found. In the interim, Macedonia's received schizophrenic reception on the world stage. While "The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia" has been widely used by all international organizations, 167 states including the US, Russia, Germany and China have recognized Macedonia under its constitutional name.¹⁰

In spite of the provision made in article 11 of the Interim Agreement that Greece should not block Macedonia in its processes of integration into international organizations and associations of states while negotiations are still taking place and could and should access to such international bodies under the name of "The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia," Greece practically (albeit not officially) vetoed Macedonia's accession to NATO at the Alliance's Summit in Bucharest on 3 April 2008.¹¹ The official summit declaration reads as follows: "Therefore we agreed that an invitation to the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia will be extended as soon as a mutually acceptable solution to the name issue has been reached. We encourage the negotiations to be resumed without delay and expect them to be concluded as soon as possible."¹² The frustration in the country rose, and an overwhelming sense of public revolt could be noted.¹³ Resolution of the name issue has been added as the "ninth benchmark" the country among the criteria the country is required to fulfill in order to start the accession negotiations.



Macedonia has been an EU candidate country since December 17th 2005 under the provisional name of "the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia" and in spite of the Commission's positive reports and recommendations for start of negotiations, the European Council has not yet passed a decision to engage into an accession negotiation process. So, in spite of the positive report of Mr. Richard Howitt, the appointed rapporteur on the country's progress in the EU integration processes, presented at the European Parliament's session on May 22nd 2013 and the Parliament's recommendation to the European Council to start the negotiations with the country, the issue of Macedonian accession to the EU did not even appear on the official agenda of the Council's meeting which took place 27-28 June 2013.¹⁴ The situation remains unchanged as far as the recommendation for accession is concerned also in case of the latest, annual report of the European Commission.¹⁵

II. 1. The name issue

The start of negotiations of Macedonia's EU accession depends on the resolution of the "name dispute" with Greece. In fact it has been added to the Copenhagen criteria for accession, as an explicit additional requirement for Macedonia.¹⁶ Since 2008, EU officials have constantly and explicitly stated that the negotiations can start only if and when Macedonia and Greece reach a mutually acceptable solution to the "name issue" under the mediation of the UN envoy Matthew Nimetz. Considering Greece is already a member country of the EU, Macedonia is in greater and more pressing need to complete this process since its commitment to enter the Union is determined by the nation's majority support for Macedonia's entry into the European Union. In December 2009, according to a survey conducted by IRI, 96% of the population was in favor Macedonia's accession to the EU.¹⁷ Nonetheless, according to the same source, support has been decreasing ever since. In November 2012 84% of the respondents favored the country's accession to the Union.¹⁸ The results of the poll conducted by ISSHS in September 2013, as part of this study, reveal that the current support for the country's EU integration consists of 71.6 % in favor among the general population and 65.6% among the ethnic Macedonians. Compared to the support expressed in 2009, ISSHS' poll results show there has been a decline of 24.4%. The decline of support will be discussed below. At this point, let us just note that in spite of the negative trend, nation's stance on Macedonia's entry into the EU is still positive and significantly above 50%.

Since 2005 several proposals made by Mr. Nimetz have been discussed by the parties involved in the "name issue" negotiations, failing to bring about a final solution to the problem. Relying on several media sources providing official statements of the political actors involved in the process, we can summarize Mr. Nimetz's official proposals in the following way:



Nimetz's proposal in April 2005

Official name of the country

<p>International use: Until 2006 Republika Makedonija (to be used by the UN Security Council until 2006, after which it would be replaced by "Republic of Macedonia")</p> <p>After 2006 Republic of Macedonia (for formal, international and multilateral use, with a footnote stating that Greece refers to the country as "Republika Makedonija-Skopje")</p>
--

<p>Bilateral use: "Republika Makedonija-Skopje" Greece would refer to the country as "Republika Makedonija-Skopje" in bilateral communication as well as in multilateral</p>
--

Language:
"Macedonian"

Identity:
In the naming of the nationality, instead of an usage of an adjective ("Macedonian") Nimetz proposes the following formulation“

**[nationality] of Republika Makedonia"
or "[nationality] of Republic of Macedonia."**

Athens: No

Greece rejected the proposal instantly and consensually, with the support of all major parliamentary parties.

Skopje: Yes

Mr. Nimetz's proposal from 2005 was acceptable to the President of Macedonia Branko Crvenkovski and the then ruling party, the Social Democratic Union of Macedonia (SDSM) while the biggest opposition party at the time, VMRO-DPNE, was not in favor it.¹⁹

**2008
Official
proposal**

In 2008, facing the NATO Summit in Bucharest at which Macedonia was expected to be extended invitation to membership in the Alliance, Mr. Matthew Nimetz proposed a new solution in order to avoid the eventual Greek veto.

Official name of the country

International use:
Republic of Macedonia-Skopje

It was proposed for international and formal usage in the UN, whereas the countries which have bilaterally recognized Macedonia under its constitutional name would be encouraged to use the formal UN denomination without imposing it or interfering in the bilateral communication.²⁰

Bilateral:
///

Language: ///

Identity:

As for the adjective expressing nationality and naming of the language no specific propositions are known to the public except for some sources stating that both sides would have the unlimited right to use the adjective in political, ethnic and economic communication."²¹

Skopje: Yes

Macedonia accepted as a proposal to be voted on a national referendum (April 2008). Toward the end of March 2008 and only a few days before the NATO Summit in Bucharest on 3 April 2008, Greece rejected the proposal.²² According to the Summit's official statement, in spite of the acknowledgment of fulfillment of criteria, Macedonia did not receive an invitation to membership for one reason only - the absence of solution to the name dispute. The formal act of extending an invitation would take place as soon as "the name issue is resolved."²³ Note: Mr. Nikola Gruevski, the Prime Minister of Macedonia and the ruling party VMRO-DPMNE agreed to organize a national referendum on Mr. Nimetz's proposal.²⁴

Athens: No

Toward the end of March 2008 and only a few days before the NATO Summit in Bucharest on 3 April 2008, Greece rejected the proposal.²⁵ Note: In 2011, The International Court of Justice in the Hague ruled that "Greece, by objecting to the admission of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to Nato, has breached its obligation."²⁶ The ICJ's ruling did not change NATO position on the name issue and its status of the chief condition for Macedonia's membership in the Alliance.²⁷

2008 - 2013
Informal
proposal

Nimetz's informal proposal in 2013 (initially proposed as second proposal in 2008)

Official name of the country

International:

"Upper Macedonia"/"Republic of Upper Macedonia"/"Upper Republic of Macedonia"
or
"Northern Republic of Macedonia"/"Republic of Northern Macedonia."

These proposals are still being debated. In September 2013, another negotiations round took place and it involved the proposal from 2008.

Bilateral: ///

Language: ///

Identity: ///

Skopje: ///

Athens rejected Nimetz's proposal before Skopje could state its position.²⁸

Athens: No

In both proposals what is missing is the "erga omnes" solution on which Greece has constantly insisted regardless of the ruling power in Government.²⁹ *Erga omnes* implies that the formal UN denomination should be enforced both by all countries which have recognized Macedonia under its constitutional name which would result into annulling their national legal document concerning a bilateral issue as well as Macedonia's own renaming in its national constitution and in all documents of individual citizens (namely, passports and ID cards).

II. 2. The issue of "antiquization"

"Antiquization" is a buzzword created in the local Macedonian political debate to critically refer to the processes of cultural production of historic symbolism which links the contemporary Macedonian ethnic identity with that of Ancient Macedonia and Hellenic Antiquity. The processes of "antiquization" are relatively recent and they are linked directly to the introduction of the name issue as one of the major criteria for the country's accession into the EU and NATO. "Skopje 2014 Project" was announced as a project of rebirth of cultural heritage and commemoration of the historic truth about the Macedonian national identity at a press conference organized by the Municipality of Center of the city of Skopje organized in February 2010, in a joint presentation held by the Mayor of Municipality of Center Mr. Vladimir Todorovikj and the Minister of Culture Ms. Elizabeta Kančeska-Milevska.³⁰

In a period of less than three years 35 monumental buildings and sculptures in a predominantly neoclassicist style of have sprung up at the center of Skopje. Central and most monumental among them is the statue "Warrior on A Horse," a representation of Alexander the Great in neoclassicist style or rather an approximation of neoclassicism (which sometimes resembles baroque and social-realism). The statue itself is 14, 5 meters high and weighs 30 tones. It is set on a 10 meter high pedestal which finishes with a fountain, surrounded by statues representing eight soldiers of the area of Ancient Kingdom of Macedon and eight bronze lions which are 2, 5 meters tall. From the highest point of the pedestal fountain water is falling while classical music is played in the background.³¹ Only 150 meters further, right across the Stone bridge over Vardar, a gigantic bronze sculpture of the "warrior's father," Philip of Macedon II is placed amidst a smaller bronze statues of four horses and three breast feeding women. The central sculpture in this composition is not named Philip the Second. Nonetheless the space around it, including not only the sculptural composition just explained but also a fountain and several other smaller sets of sculptures, is named "Philip the Second Square." The central figure is 13 meters tall. It is placed on a 16 meters high pedestal.³² In terms of style, this is yet another example of Skopje's unique version of neoclassicism, one combined with purely decorative abundance of detail and static monumentality of social-realism. Among the 35 objects built as part of this project is Arch of Triumph, on a square called "Pella" (the capital of the Ancient Kingdom of Macedon). It is placed at a distance of less than 100 meters away from the Statue of Alexander the Great. The 21 meters high monumental arch is covered with reliefs depicting Macedonian history and culture since the time of Antiquity.³³ These are only the most prominent examples of what Skopje 2014 entails in terms of historic and cultural reference as well as its scale, both in terms of its monumentality as well as its financial worth illustrated by the type of material used and the sheer size of it. Smaller monuments depicting other historic periods are present too. However, their size, number and spatial positioning are marginal compared to the three examples of monument with reference to Antiquity.

Although never used in any official document, the word "antiquization" surfaces in some debates in the EU Parliament referring directly to the "Skopje 2014 Project."³⁴ In short, none of the officially issued documents by any of the institutions of the European Commission makes direct reference to the Project itself nor does any official document talk about "the problem" of Macedonia's "usurpation of Greek cultural heritage" and "counterfeiting history."³⁵



Statue of "The Warrior" (Philip II)



Triumphant Arch

As explained above, *de facto*, the name issue remains the key element for the EU accession of Macedonia. In spite of the insistence of the Greek state that Macedonia's "territorial pretensions" are expressed through the "usurpation of the Greek cultural heritage," cultural heritage related policies are never mentioned in any of the reports on Macedonia's EU progress.³⁶ Taking into consideration the fact that since 2009, all of the progress reports concerning Macedonia's EU accession have been positive and recommending initiation of negotiations for accession, one could say that "the name issue" is the only obstacle not only *de facto* but also *de iure*.³⁷ The reports have all been adopted by the EU Parliament with an overwhelmingly positive vote, accompanied by official recommendations to the European Council for an official start of the process of accession negotiations. The European Council has never endorsed any of these recommendations, albeit "noting them." In addition to the acknowledgment of fulfillment of criteria, the Council has habitually underscored that the solution of the name issue and the "maintaining of good neighborly relations" are of essential importance.

The Council broadly shares the Commission's assessment of the country's sufficient fulfillment of the political criteria and notes that the Commission has further reiterated its recommendation that accession negotiations should be opened with the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. The Council is ready to return to the matter during the next Presidency. Maintaining good neighborly relations, including a negotiated and mutually accepted solution to the name issue, under the auspices of the UN, is essential. The Council looks forward to the ongoing high-level dialogue bringing results shortly.³⁸

In the quote above, we can note an explicit link between "good neighborly relations" and the name issue. However, one can also note that they are two distinct concepts. "Maintaining good neighborly relations" is a rather general formulation, and its meaning can range from good economic to good cultural relations. A major cultural heritage related project relying on ample reference to the period of Antiquity linked with the history of the Kingdom of Macedon necessarily affects the good neighborly relations. In spite of its invisibility in the official discourse, the Project is directly related to the source of the name dispute, viz. the Greek fears of a supposed Macedonian pretension to "steal its culture and history."

The only instances of cultural policy related decisions made by the Macedonian government that have become subject to EU institutions' criticism on the grounds of provocation deemed as detrimental to the "good neighborly relations" to be maintained with Greece are the following:

1) the renaming of Skopje Airport into "Alexander the Great" (noted in the country report of 2007);³⁹ 2) the naming of a motorway which is part of the trans-European transport corridor as Alexander of Macedon (noted in the country report of 2009);⁴⁰ 3) the erecting of the statue "Warrior on a Horse" (which "resembles" Alexander the Great) noted in the 2011 report.⁴¹ As far as the denomination of "Project Skopje 2014" is concerned, none of the European Commission's country progress reports or European Council's decisions either uses it or refers to the process itself.

The Report released by the European Commission in April 2013 does not mention any instance of provocation through cultural policies with historic references to Antiquity that might be perceived as "usurpation of the Greek cultural heritage" and be, therefore, detrimental to the good neighborly relations. In short, it does not note the phenomenon of "Skopje 2014" or any other cultural processes of the same type. Nonetheless, it starts with a statement that is a response to following recommendation of the European Council:

"With a view to a possible decision of the European Council to open accession negotiations with the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the Council will examine, on the basis of a report to be presented by the Commission in Spring 2013, implementation of reforms in the context of the HLAD, as well as steps *taken to promote good neighborly relations and to reach a negotiated and mutually accepted solution to the name issue under the auspices of the UN.*" (ISSHS' emphasis)

To sum up, although never explicitly stated so in any of the official documents of the European Union, "Project Skopje 2014" can present a problem to the EU accession processes of the country since it plays an important part in the context of the so-called "name issue." As explained above, "Skopje 2014" is constructed as a project of cultural affirmation and assertion of a historic truth about the Macedonian ethnic identity, seen under threat in the context of the "name dispute" as both bilateral and multilateral international issue.

The name dispute exists precisely because of Greece's concerns that, through the usage of the denomination "Macedonia," Republic of Macedonia claims Greek history and cultural heritage as its own. Greece estimates that *through such claims* (i.e., claims to history and culture), Macedonia's denomination would become a threat to the "territorial integrity" of Greece. This formulation of the problem between the two countries called the "name dispute" can be found on the official website of the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs:

"The name issue is thus a problem with regional and international dimensions, consisting in the promotion of irredentist and territorial ambitions on the part of the *Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia*, mainly through the counterfeiting of history and usurpation of Greece's national and historical heritage"⁴²

If according to the Greek official position Macedonia expresses "territorial ambitions" through "counterfeiting history" and "usurping historical heritage," the Project indirectly affects the pace of the name dispute negotiations due to its reception in Greece. The influence is only indirect since it has not been noted as a problem per se in the EU official statements and documents (perhaps because a claim about "territorial endangerment" coming from "cultural usurpation" is not one that can be politically legitimized in all seriousness). Therefore, although not explicitly mentioned in the European Commission's country reports and other official documents related to the accession process, "Skopje 2014" plays a relevant and indirect role in the pace if not the very possibility of Macedonia's integration into the EU.

III. Presentation of Poll Results on "Skopje 2014 Project"


The qualitative study on "Skopje 2014 Project" and its effects on the perception of what constitutes the ethnic Macedonian identity, conducted by ISSHS in April-May 2013, unraveled blatant discrepancies between the ordinary citizen's perception of the "true Macedonian identity" and the one professed by the State. The questions concerned historical periods, personalities and forms of cultural heritage perceived as formative of the Macedonian identity. The discrepancies at issue stem from the fact that the perception of the citizens of Skopje assigns a rather marginal position to the period of Antiquity in its own narrative of the national self unlike the Government which has done the opposite. The styles of neoclassicism and the architectural or the material cultural heritage are absent from the ordinary people's perception of the cultural heritage defining of the "Macedonian Self" (the participants in the focus groups and the interviewees unanimously stated that immaterial cultural such as folklore songs, cuisine, etc to be the defining feature of the "true Macedonian heritage" rather than any form of architecture or material culture).⁴³ National representativeness of the results received in the previous study was tested in a poll conducted by the Institute in September 2013. To the identity, history and cultural heritage related questions we added questions concerning the influence of "Skopje 2014 Project" on the EU integration processes as well as a question concerning its financial or economic aspects. The poll's questionnaire was applied on a sample of 1240 respondents and was conceptualized as demographically representative, taking into account ethnicity, gender, age and education.¹

The main findings of the poll are the following:


1) With regard to the historical narrative of "Skopje 2014" promoting Antiquity as the defining historical layer and cultural trait of the Macedonian identity, the majority of the population expresses a different and an even opposing view. Only 5.8% of the general population see it as historically and culturally defining, whereas among the ethnic Macedonians we got the result of 7.6%. The majority of the ethnic Macedonians identify the period of the Medieval Slavic Christianity (of the so-called "enlighteners" St Cyril and St Methodius) as the most formative one from the less recent past. An average of one quarter of the respondents identified the periods of the independence from SFR Yugoslavia, that of participation in the Federation of the SFR Yugoslavia, the IMRO period and that of the Medieval Slavic Christianity as historically defining for the formation of the Macedonian ethnic identity. The prominence of Orthodoxy and Slavic self-identification over Alexander's Antiquity among the ethnic Macedonians proves radical discrepancy between the population's sentiment and the narrative the Government seeks to promote.

¹The number of respondents constitute a nationally representative sample. The questionnaire is an annex to this document.

According to you, which was the most important period for formation of Macedonian identity?



According to you, which was the most important period for formation of Macedonian identity? (only among Macedonians)




2) Consistently with the first question, a rather small percentage of respondents has identified Alexander the Great as the most important historic personality for the formation of the Macedonian identity 10.5% of the general population and 12.3% among the ethnic Macedonians. The percentage does not overlap completely with that of identifying Antiquity as defining, since the cult of a person or the myth of a national hero is a socio-cultural phenomenon in its own right, derived from its intrinsic cultural and psychological structure. One should also note that 2% of the Ethnic Albanians in Macedonia also see Alexander as formative of their own identity, as presented in the annexes of this report.

According to you, who is the most important historic personality for the formation of the Macedonian identity?




According to you, who is the most important historic personality for the formation of the Macedonian identity? (only among Macedonians)




3) As mentioned above, the previous study of ISSHS on the topic of "Skopje 2014 Project"⁴⁴ established that not only the identity narrative itself but also the esthetic paradigm the project seeks to promote is perceived as culturally alien and alienating (rather than as something which would related to the sense of cultural intimacy). The national poll shows that only 24.4% of the population approve of the appearance of the buildings, whereas 22.6 responded they "somewhat like it". Considering the express reluctance of most of the respondents to criticize the project and the occasional respondents' comments about having a problem of "exaggeration" when they chose the "somewhat like it" answer, we tend to interpret the 22.6% result as one leaning more toward "do not like it" rather than "like it." This interpretation can be corroborated by evidence provided through focus groups and interviews carried out for the purposes of the previous study. For example, one of the participants of the focus groups who "somewhat likes the project," also comments: "It's too much. When you look at the square from the side of the Arch of Triumph, that enormous numbers of monuments, that pile over there...that must seem weird to the foreigners... they take photos and marvel at it..." Another comment of a participant who "partially likes it": "It's a bit tasteless! It reminds me of a housewife who has decorated her living room with too many nice things... but she could have done it with more taste! It looks like a home of a housewife with lack of taste, one who has spent a lot of money to decorate it in a way so that it's obvious that she has spent a fortune and that she is owns the place... but if you open the other rooms, well..." 45% responded they did not like the appearance of the new buildings and monuments.

Do you like the appearance of the buildings and monuments from the Project Skopje 2014?




Do you like the appearance of the buildings and monuments from the Project Skopje 2014? (only among Macedonians)




This result is in correspondence with the results of the previous study which prove that the folkloric culture of Balkan or post-Ottoman and Orthodox Christian provenance is seen as the paradigmatic culture rather than the pseudo-baroque and pseudo-neoclassicist style promoted by "Skopje 2014."

4) There is overwhelming disapproval of the project from the financial point of view, and for this reason primarily a significant majority of the respondents would not like to see the Project further pursued.


Do you approve the project Skopje 2014 from the financial point of view?




Do you approve the project Skopje 2014 from the financial point of view? (only among Macedonians)



Do you think that the building of this type of buildings and monuments (belonging to the project Skopje 2014) should continue?




Do you think that the building of this type of buildings and monuments (belonging to the project Skopje 2014) should continue? (only among Macedonians)




5) The opinion whether the Project influences Macedonia's EU integration is utterly split among the general population. 44.6% of the ethnic Macedonians respondents gave a negative answer to the question. In the desk analysis above, we brought forward data which proves that, in terms of official rhetoric, only the name issue influences the integration processes and we assumed that the project might have an effect on the process concerning cultural heritage and history are at the core of the so-called name issue. The split public opinion corresponds with the absence of clear and explicit position on the side of the EU institutions as far as "Skopje 2014" is concerned.

Do you think that "Project Skopje 2014" could negatively affect the integration of R. Macedonia into EU and NATO?




Do you think that "Project Skopje 2014" could negatively affect the integration of R. Macedonia into EU and NATO? (only among Macedonians)




6) The support of the nation for the EU integration processes has significantly fallen in the last couple of years (compared to the situation explained in the desk analysis presented above). According to our poll results, 71.6% respondents of the general population favor the country's EU accession, whereas only 65.8% of the ethnic Macedonians express a positive view on Macedonia's entry into EU (and NATO). Let's note that the approval is still high and well above 50%. Yet again, considering the fact that since the end of the 90' the percentage of those in favor of the integration processes has always been around and mostly above 90%, 71.6% is indeed low (among ethnic Macedonians, Serbs and Vlachs even lower - 65.8%).

Do you personally want R. Macedonia to become member of EU and NATO?



Do you personally want R. Macedonia to become member of EU and NATO? (only among Macedonians)



If we look at the entirety of poll results, it becomes evident that the decreased support for the integration processes is not the product of the cultural nation building processes and the "Skopje 2014 Project" more specifically. Namely, respondents remain either unaffected by the narrative the Project seeks to convey or opposed to it.

Therefore the significant fall of the positive view on country's EU integration prospects must be the result of some other factor. If we look at the data presented above, one of the logical conclusions to draw would be that the sense of endlessly prolonged accession is the source of the public's decreased enthusiasm for joining EU. Another logical conclusion would be that this process is seen as unfair, if we take into consideration the fact that not only a constitutional self-determination is being negated through it, but also that, in spite of this, Macedonia has expressed willingness to accept all of the official proposals made by the UN mediators so far and this fact has not been gratified in any way.

One of the smaller sculptural compositions at "Philip II" Square



IV. Conclusions

The desk analysis of EU institutions' official documents and statements carried out as part of the present study, provides the background against which we have interpreted the data received through the poll.

The evidence presented above, in the form of official statements and documents, begs the conclusion that the name dispute cannot be resolved unless the *erga omnes* condition is accepted by the Macedonian side. Considering the fact that *erga omnes* is feasible only via Macedonia's change of the constitution and, through that, its constitutional name, this is an issue which is unlikely to be resolved on a bilateral diplomatic basis and in a foreseeable future. The nation's will to enter the European Union does not represent a sufficiently strong motivation to initiate and undergo a change of such scale (let us note that - as demonstrated above - this will is now in a sustained trend of decline).

Against the background of the name issue negotiations (presented above), we have interpreted the results of the poll concerning questions of identity and cultural heritage. Namely, Greece's requirement for change of the name of the state is motivated by the concerns that its "cultural heritage is being usurped" by Macedonia through the use of the name itself. The poll shows that:

- (a) in spite of the existence of the national denominator "Macedonia" for almost 70 years (as a republic in the Federation of Yugoslavia as well as an independent state), and
- (b) amidst an era of strong national promotion of an Antiquity centered national narrative, more than 90% of the Macedonian nation does not perceive the period of Antiquity as defining of the ethnic and national identity. Therefore, Greece's concerns that conditioned the dispute in the first place, we conclude, are unfounded.

The poll also shows rapid decrease of the nation's support for the country's entry into the EU. Therefore, we conclude:

- If the solution of the name issue is a requirement for the country's accession, the EU should take a pro-active diplomatic role in resolving the dispute and/or inventing a solution for its status in the negotiation processes. The EU should become an active player in the process also because of the fact that its strategic goal of enlargement is endangered by the absence of a solution to the problem at stake.
- The Government of Macedonia should cease further pursuing "Skopje 2014" for two main reasons identified on the basis of our poll's results: a) the Project is at odds with what the majority of the Macedonian population perceives as a viable narrative of the national identity in terms of its cultural heritage and history; b) notable majority of the population disapproves of it and favors its discontinuation.



ENDNOTES

1. „Преродбата го преродува Скопје“ [The Rebirth Brings Back to Life Skopje], *Дневник* (Фебруари 4, 2010), available at <http://www.dnevnik.com.mk/default.asp?ItemID=C9593E0AA8335641B88ADD0EC18566E6>

2. *Ibid.*

3. Katerina Kolozova et al., "Skopje 2014 Project and its Effects on the Perception of Macedonian Identity Among the Citizens of Skopje" (ISSHS June 30th 2013), available at <http://www.isshs.edu.mk/documents/1-Sk2014-ENG.pdf>, accessed on 2 October 2013.

4. European Economic Forecast Winter 2013", available at http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/european_economy/2013/pdf/ee1_en.pdf, accessed on 3 October 2013.

5. „Отчет: Скопје 2014 чини 207 милиони евра,“ ["Public Accounting: Skopje 2014 costs 207 million euro"] available at http://kanal5.com.mk/vesti_detail.asp?ID=5050, accessed on 29 June 2013; see also: „Околу 207 милиони евра се потрошени за Скопје 2014“, *Нова Македонија* (22 април 2013), available at <http://www.novamakedonija.com.mk/DetalNewsInstant.asp?vestInstant=17304>, accessed on 29 June 2013.

6. "Отчет „Скопје 2014“ - 110 милиони евра за згради, 2 милиона евра за ПП апарати, 581.900 евра за завеса... [Public accounting on Skopje 2014 - 110 million on buildings, 2 million on fire extinguishers, 581.900 euro for a curtain...]," Plus Info Portal (22 April 2013), available at <http://www.plusinfo.mk/vest/89605/GALERIJA-Otchet-Skopje-2014---110-milioni-evra-za-zgradi-2-miliona-evra-za-PP-aparati-581900-evra-za-zavesa->, accessed on 29 October 2013.

7. „Жерновски: Јавното обвинителство е на потер“ ["Zernovski: It's Public Prosecutor's turn"], Nova TV (16 August 2013), available at <http://novatv.mk/index.php?navig=8&cat=2&vest=6603>, accessed on 3 October 2013.

8. Spyros A. Sofos, "Beyond the Intractability of the Greek-Macedonian Dispute," in *The Name Dispute: An Anthology of Academic Articles* (Skopje: MIC, 2012), 226.

9. The UN Security Council (UNSC), Resolution 817 (1993).

10. „Република Македонија е признаена под уставното име од 136 држави,“ *Narodna volja* (March 2013), available at <http://www.narodnavolja.com/articles2013/03/txt08.asp>, accessed on 3 October 2013.

11. Although not formally, since there was no official veto but rather firm opposition to Macedonia's accession to the Association and making a consensual decision of the member states to grant the country membership impossible. Macedonia's application to NATO was submitted as on the part of the "Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia."

12. "Bucharest Summit Declaration: Issued by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of North Atlantic Council in Bucharest on April 3 2008," available at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_8443.htm, accessed on 28 of June 2013.

13. „ЦРПМ: Кај Македонците се бележи пад во поддршката за зачувување на името“ ["CRPM: Macedonians decline the support for keeping the constitutional name"] available at <http://www.netpress.com.mk/mk/vest.asp?id=35308&kategorija=1>, accessed on 29 June 2013.

14. "European Council Meetings: 27 June 2013 - 28 June 2013 in Brussels," available at <http://www.european-council.europa.eu/council-meetings>, accessed on 28 June 2013.

15. Borjan Jovanovski, "Клучните точки во извештајот на ЕК за Македонија“ ["The main points in the EC's report on Macedonia"], Nova TV (14 October 2013), available at <http://novatv.mk/index.php?navig=8&vest=8440&cat=2>, accessed on 15 October 2013.

16. "20 Years That Changed Europe: The Copenhagen Criteria and the Enlargement of the European Union: A Conference report," (Copenhagen, 14 May 2013) available at http://um.dk/da/~media/UM/Danish-site/Documents/Politik-og-diplomati/Nyheder-og-publikationer/20%20Years%20that%20Changed%20Europe_UM.pdf, accessed on 24 October 2013.
17. Испитување на јавното мислење ИРИ [Public opinion poll IRI], available at <http://www.sep.gov.mk/content/?id=54#.Ukcin4YwffJ>, accessed on 28 September 2013.
18. *Ibid.*
19. „Ексклузивно: Што одби Груевски во 2005 година“ [“What Gruevski rejected in 2005”], *Plusinfo* (29 May 2012), available at <http://www.plusinfo.mk/vest/44222/EKSKLUZIVNO-Shto-odbi-Gruevski-vo-2005-godina>, accessed on 30 September 2013.
20. „Сè се врти околу Северна и Горна Македонија“ [“Everything is about Northern and Upper Macedonia”], *Utrinski Vesnik* (22 August 2008), available at <http://www.utrinski.mk/default.asp?ItemID=00CC91CCEEC7CC4BB6FB75F0A097DC30>, accessed on 30 September 2013.
21. “Nimetz's new proposal provides a name in English transcription to be used for international communication while the constitutional for remains for internal use. It is recommended to the countries that recognize the constitutional name of the Republic of Macedonia to use the new name, nonetheless without any obligation. The adjective “Macedonian” without constraints can be used by both Macedonia and Greece”, a quote from „Викендов трескавично ќе се усогласуваат ставовите за пакетот на Нимиц“ [“This weekend hasty harmonization of position with regard to Nimetz's package”], *Утрински Весник* (28 March 2008), available at <http://www.utrinski.mk/default.asp?ItemID=49DED4C5E9C55A4493657351A1C75D40>, accessed on 30 September 2013. In the same article, Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs Dora Bakoyannis is quoted: "The dissatisfaction of Athens comes from the fact that Matthew Nimetz's new proposal does not specify the use of the adjective 'Macedonian' for political, ethnic or trade purposes. "
22. „Атина го одби предлогот на Нимиц“ [“Athens rejected Nimetz's proposal”], *Deutsche Welle* (27 March 2008), available at <http://www.dw.de/атина-го-одби-предлогот-на-нимиц/a-3220286>, accessed on 30 September 2013.
23. "Bucharest Summit Declaration: Issued by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of North Atlantic Council in Bucharest on April 3 2008," available at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_8443.htm, accessed on 29 September 2013. In the document we see the following statement on Macedonia: "We recognize the hard work and the commitment demonstrated by the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia1 to NATO values and Alliance operations. We commend them for their efforts to build a multi-ethnic society. Within the framework of the UN, many actors have worked hard to resolve the name issue, but the Alliance has noted with regret that these talks have not produced a successful outcome. Therefore we agreed that an invitation to the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia will be extended as soon as a mutually acceptable solution to the name issue has been reached. We encourage the negotiations to be resumed without delay and expect them to be concluded as soon as possible."
24. „Груевски: Предлогот на Нимиц од 2005. немаше гаранции за идентитетот“ [“Gruevski: Nimetz's proposal from 2005 didn't guarantee about the identity”], *Deutsche Welle* (31 May 2012), available at <http://www.dw.de/груевски-предлогот-на-нимиц-од-2005-немаше-гаранции-за-идентитетот/a-15988954>, accessed on 30 September 2013.
25. „Атина го одби предлогот на Нимиц“ [“Athens rejected Nimetz's proposal”], *Deutsche Welle* (27 March 2008), available at <http://www.dw.de/атина-го-одби-предлогот-на-нимиц/a-3220286>, accessed on 30 September 2013.
26. "ICJ rules Greece 'wrong' to block Macedonia's Nato bid ," BBC News Europe (5 December 2011), available at <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-16032198>, accessed on 29 September 2013.

27. "We have agreed that an invitation will be extended to FYROM as soon as a mutually acceptable solution is reached on the name issue," NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen stated, underlining that the NATO decision has been reaffirmed by subsequent summit meetings and ministerial meetings held by the alliance," a quote from "Reactions to Fyrom verdict" (6 December 2011), available at <http://www.defencegreece.com/index.php/2011/12/reactions-to-fyrom-verdict/>, accessed on 3 October 2013.

28. „Нимиц: Грција инсистира на име за севкупна употреба,“ ["Nimetz: Greece Insists on a Name of Universal Usage"] Deutsche Welle (11 September 2013), available at http://www.dw.de/нимиц-грција-инсистира-на-име-за-севкупна-употреба/a-17082945?maca=maz-TB_maz_utrinski-5917-xml-mrss, accessed on 29 September 2013.

29. Ibid.

30. „Преродбата го преродува Скопје“ ["The Rebirth Brings Back to Life Skopje"], Дневник (4 February 2010), available at <http://www.dnevnik.com.mk/default.asp?ItemID=C9593E0AA8335641B88ADD0EC18566E6>, accessed on 29 June 2013; see also "The Skopje 2014 Project Presented," Macedonian Information Agency (February 4, 2010), available at <http://www.idividi.com.mk/vesti/makedonija/578522/>, accessed on 29 June 2013.

31. „Се тргаат тарабите околу Воинот на коњ, од денеска ќе проработи и фонтаната“ ["The fence around Warrior on a horse is moved, from today the fountain will start working"] available at <http://www.dnevnik.mk/default.asp?ItemID=88E3EF7594AA81498FE6A39BC73D23B6>, accessed on 28 October 2013.

32. „Плошадот „Карпошово востание“ стана „Филип Втори“ [“Karpos's Rebellion Square renamed in “Philip II”] available at <http://www.plusinfo.mk/vest/100346/Ploshtadot-Karposhovo-vostanie-stana-Filip-Vtori>, accessed on 28 October 2013.

33. „Порта Македонија“ свечено претставена на јавноста“ ["The Triumphant Arch Macedonia presented to the public"] available at <http://www.build.mk/?p=11623>, accessed on 28 October 2013.

34. Parliamentary questions, Subject: Fresh act of provocation by FYROM (6 July 2011), available at <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=WQ&reference=E-2011-006512&format=XML&language=EN>, accessed on 30 September 2013. Parliamentary questions, Joint answer given by Mr Füle on behalf of the Commission (31 August 2011) available at <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getAllAnswers.do?reference=E-2011-006512&language=EN>

35. Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs: "FYROM Name Issue," available at <http://www.mfa.gr/en/fyrom-name-issue/>, accessed on 2 October 2013.

36. Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs: "FYROM Name Issue," available at <http://www.mfa.gr/en/fyrom-name-issue/>, accessed on 2 October 2013.

37. "The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 2009 Progress Report" available at http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2009/mk_rapport_2009_en.pdf, accessed on 29 September 2013.

"The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 2010 Progress Report" available at http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2010/package/mk_rapport_2010_en.pdf, accessed on 29 September 2013.

"The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 2011 Progress Report" available at http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2011/package/mk_rapport_2011_en.pdf, accessed on 29 September 2013.

"The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 2012 Progress Report" available at http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2012/package/mk_rapport_2012_en.pdf, accessed on 29 September 2013.

38. Council of the European Union: "Council conclusions on enlargement and stabilisation and association process: 3132nd General Affairs Council meeting" (Brussels, 5 December 2011), available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/genaff/126577.pdf, accessed on 1 October 2013.

39.The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 2007 Progress Report, available at http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2007/nov/fyrom_progress_reports_en.pdf

40.“The government named a motorway which forms part of trans-European transport corridor X after 'Alexander of Macedon'. This was received as a provocation by Greece, which consequently suspended its financial contribution towards construction of the motorway. Actions and statements which could negatively impact on good neighbourly relations should be avoided. Maintaining good neighbourly relations, including a negotiated and mutually acceptable solution to the name issue, under the auspices of the UN, remains essential.”

41.“The government erected a statue in the centre of Skopje which was seen by Greece as a provocation because of its resemblance to Alexander the Great. Actions and statements which could adversely affect good neighbourly relations should be avoided. The hearings started on the legal proceedings initiated by the country against Greece before the International Court of Justice in The Hague regarding the bilateral interim accord of 1995. Maintaining good neighbourly relations, including a negotiated and mutually acceptable solution to the name issue, under the auspices of the UN, remains essential.”

42.Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs: "FYROM Name Issue," available at <http://www.mfa.gr/en/fyrom-name-issue/>, accessed on 2 October 2013.

43.See Katerina Kolozova et al., "Skopje 2014 Project and its Effects on the Perception of Macedonian Identity Among the Citizens of Skopje" (ISSHS June 30th 2013), available at <http://www.isshs.edu.mk/documents/1-Sk2014-ENG.pdf>, accessed on 2 October 2013.

44.*Ibid.*



**INSTITUTE OF
SOCIAL
SCIENCES AND
HUMANITIES
SKOPJE**

**INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
AND HUMANITIES - SKOPJE**

str. 20 Oktomvri, no.8. second floor
1000 Skopje, Macedonia

tel/fax: +389 2 3113 059
e-mail: info@isshs.edu.mk
www.isshs.edu.mk

In institutional partnership with:



This study is financially supported by the Think Tank Fund of the Open Society Foundations as part of the general support to ISSHS.



Schweizerische Eidgenossenschaft
Confédération suisse
Confederazione Svizzera
Confederaziun svizra
Swiss Agency for Development
and Cooperation SDC

